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SYMBOLIC SPEECH
I. INTRODUCTION
While the extent of first amendment protection remains unclarified,1 politi-
cal speech has always been protected. The Supreme Court has observed:
"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs ...
[D]iscussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner
in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters
relating to political processes,"'2 are included.
In recent years political expression has frequently taken the form of
symbolic conduct. This has been defined as the communication of opinion by
conduct rather than by the spoken word. 3 Use of symbolic conduct largely has
been a result of the participant's lack of access to the government and the
media. Although attention may be paid to grievances expressed in street
corner speeches, it has been found that dramatic conduct will focus both
media and government attention and provide the participant with a wider
audience for his grievance. 4 A recent district court opinion, for example,
recognized that by establishing a symbolic campsite on the Capitol Mall, a
Vietnam veterans' group "was able to attract considerable media attention
which [was] indispensable to the effective dissemination of [its] viewpoints." 5
That conduct may be sufficiently communicative to enjoy first amendment
protection was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Stromberg v.
1. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (whether the Pentagon
Papers should be published brought forth ten opinions).
2. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (upheld the right of newspaper editor to
publish editorial on election day urging citizens to vote in a particular manner). The Court has
observed: "[O]ur history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness
-that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society." Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969). See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). The first amendment was written "to clear the
way for thinking which serves the general welfare." A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 42 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Political Freedom]; Weber, Clashing Symbols in the First Amendment
Arena: The Growing Implications of Street v. New York, 17 St. Louis L.J. 433, 455 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Weber]; see Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 at 108 (1904).
3. "[S]ymbolism [is] a 'primitive but effective way of communicating ideas ... ' and 'a short
cut from mind to mind.' " Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam) quoting
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); see People v. Stover, 12
N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (hanging
tattered clothing and other objects on clothesline each year to protest tax rates).
4. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 79-80 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Emerson]; McBride, Mr. Justice Black and his Qualified Absolutes, 2 Loyola U.L. Rev. 37, 59-60
(1969); Weber 440; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Symbolic Conduct].
5. Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Morton, 379 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1974).
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California, 6 in which a state statute prohibiting the display of a red flag as a
symbol of opposition to organized government was invalidated. Although
Stromberg implicitly recognized that communicative conduct was protected, 7
the Court did not face the issue of the protection to be afforded symbolic
speech until United States v. O'Brien.8 In O'Brien, the defendant publicly
burned his draft card to demonstrate his opposition both to the Selective
Service System and to the war in Vietnam. The defendant intentionally chose
this means of expression "to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs. . ..9
Aware that such conduct contravened federal law, O'Brien argued that
the proscription of his action violated his first amendment right of free
speech."0 The Court, assuming that O'Brien's conduct was protected, held
that the government's interest in regulating the non-speech element of the
conduct justified the incidental proscription of the defendant's freedom of
expression. I,
Conduct amounting to political expression therefore may be regulated
under the proper circumstances. Certain symbolic conduct guidelines have
been developed to measure the legitimacy of these regulations. This Note will
first analyze these guidelines, and then discuss them in terms of a recent case,
United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court. 12
Notwithstanding the fact that symbolic conduct is accorded first amend-
ment protection, not all conduct intended as communicative can be
protected. 13 Pouring blood on Selective Service files can be highly com-
6. 283 U.s. 359 (1931).
7. Id. at 368-69.
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Conduct such as distributing leaflets and certain types of picketing is
now clearly within the ambit of the first amendment. Flower v. United States. 407 U.S. 197
(1972) (leaflet distribution on military base); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe. 402 U.S.
415 (1971) (informational picketing); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (wearing
military uniform in anti-war street theater); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)
(parading without permit); Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974), appeal
docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1974) (No. 74-337) (topless dancing in cabaret);
Concerned Consumers League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (consumer
picketing); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 29, 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer]; cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 614 (1971) (statute found overbroad because it proscribed constitutionally protected con-
duct).
9. 391 U.S. at 370.
10. Id. at 369-70.
11. Id. at 376-77.
12. Civil No. 71-2738 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 7, 1974).
13. "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labelled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376; see Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377, 386
(2d Cir. 1973) (student sleep-in for an all black dormitory); New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480
F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (hair length); Wright v. Bailey, 381 F.
Supp. 924 (W.D. Va. 1974) (jerking arm free from grasp of arresting officer); Hurley v. Hinckley,
304 F. Supp. 704, 708 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970)
(presenting petitions after moving into office space of and interfering with a public agency).
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municative of aversion to war making,' 4 but as conduct which collides with a
valid statutory proscription it will not be protected. 15
Moreover, even when communicative conduct falls within the first
amendment's ambit, it enjoys a lesser standard of protection than pure
speech.'6 "[A]s the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the
commission of public acts . . . the scope of permissible state regulations
significantly increases."' 7 The Court also has decided that, for purposes of the
first amendment overbreadth doctrine, regulation of conduct raises fewer
questions than regulation of speech, even where both are protected by the first
amendment. '
8
A sliding scale has been established by the Court to determine the degree of
14. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970). Destroying
Selective Service files with napalm is in the same category. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
15. When a demonstration turns violent it loses its first amendment protection. Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); see Bullock v. Mumford, Civil No. 71-2058, at 5
(D.C. Cir., Oct. 21, 1974); Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," the First Amendment and the Boston
Tea Party, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 185, 189 (1970). In Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County, 504 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1974), employees "[mlethodically interfered with the telephonic communications
system at the Welfare Center Building by removing telephone receivers from their cradles and by
inserting broken pencils therein ...resulting in a major backup of incoming calls ... " Id. at
1192. The court noted that "[a]lthough the action taken was concerted response in a dispute with
management .. .we think the physical interference with communication and the conduct of
public business was too deliberate, substantially disruptive, and prolonged to be classified as
symbolic speech and protected expression." Id. at 1193 n.2.
16. " '[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments [do not] afford the same kind of freedom to
those who would communicate ideas by conduct ...as these amendments afford to those who
communicate ideas by pure speech.' " Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969),
quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). "[I]t is now clear that the communication of
ideas by conduct is not guaranteed the same degree of protection accorded communication by
pure speech." Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
969 (1972) (footnote omitted); see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1945); Acanfora v.
Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 855 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 64 (1974); see People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 234-35, 229 N.E.2d
187, 189-90, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493-94 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 576 (1969);
Nimmer 30-32; The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv L. Rev. 57, 151 n.58 (1973). One
commentator has argued that the "historical framework and general purpose behind the first
amendment do not support" the position that symbolic speech receives less protection than is
afforded pure speech. Symbolic Conduct 1105. But see L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression 236
(1960). Where the right of association is involved, however, the state must demonstrate a
compelling interest to subordinate it, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
463 (1958). The right to affiliate with a political party is a basic constitutional freedom that
cannot suffer significant encroachment merely on the showing of a legitimate state interest.
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973). The fact that association may be in the form of
conduct does not diminish its first amendment protection.
17. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
18. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (affirming the validity of state statute
proscribing political activities by state employees).
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first amendment protection available in the area of speechlconduct. While
protected pure speech is on one end of the scale, and unprotected non-
communicative conduct is on the other, the distinction is obscure in the
middle range where both speech and communicative conduct come within the
first amendment. 19 As Justice Brennan has indicated, "it is hard to know
whether the protected activity falling within the [state] Act should be consid-
ered speech or conduct." 20 Moreover, as one commentator noted, there is
little distinction between constitutionally protected vigorous debate with
co-workers and the solicitation of votes which was proscribed by the state
statute in Broadrick v. Oklahoma . 2'
Even when the Court recognized the wearing of a black armband by a high
school student to protest the Vietnam war as a "primary First Amendment
[right] akin to 'pure speech,' "22 it maintained the distinction between com-
municative conduct and pure speech. 23 In a recent case concerning a
defendant's conviction for wearing a miniature flag on the seat of his pants,
Justices White and Rehnquist found a substantial state interest in regulating
flag use, but could not agree on whether the regulation limited conduct or
speech.24
I". SYMBOLIC SPEECH-WEIGHING THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Since communicative conduct can be as expressive as pure speech, and
since there is often no clear distinction between these two modes of expres-
sion, it is an inadequate solution to hold that as the mode of expression
moves from pure speech towards conduct, first amendment protection at-
tenuates. In the words of Professor Emerson, "the Court has adopted such a
narrow view of 'expression' that important sectors of the system [of freedom
of expression] are removed from any First Amendment protection."'-
19. "The Court has, as yet, not established a test for determining at what point conduct
becomes so intertwined with expression that it becomes necessary to weigh the State's interest in
proscribing conduct against the constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression-"
Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (per curiam) (Harlan, J.. concurring) tfootnote
omitted).
20. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 631 (19731 (Brennan, J., dissenting
21. See 34 Ohio St. L.J. 949, 953 n.28 (1973).
22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
23. Id. at 515 (White, J., concurring).
24. Compare "I would affirm Goguen's conviction, therefore, had he been convicted for
mutilating, trampling upon, or defacing the flag .... [But] [tlo violate the statute in this respect.
it is not enough that one 'treat' the flag; he must also treat it 'contemptuously,'. To convict
on this basis is to convict not to protect the physical integrity . . . but to punish for
communicating ideas about the flag .... " Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 587-88 t1974) (White,
J., concurring), with "[s]ince the statute ... punishes a variety of uses of the flag which would
impair its physical integrity, without regard to presence or character of expressive conduct in
connection with those uses, I think the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression." Id. at 599 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Emerson 718. Communicative conduct is a pragmatic means of communication See notes
3 & 4 supra and accompanying text. The Court has avoided coming to grips with the first
1975]
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Communicative conduct clearly may be reasonably regulated as to time,
place and manner. 26 The Court has recognized, for example, that a college
administrator may require a student group seeking official recognition to
"affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law."
27
There was no right to "flout" these regulations, 28 and the requirement to
agree not to interrupt class was a "reasonable [regulation] with respect to the
time, the place, and the manner in which student groups conduct their
speech-related activities [which] must be respected. '2 9
The first step in determining the reasonableness of a governmental regula-
tion in this area is to examine the interests involved. When individual and
governmental interests conflict under the first amendment, "a reconciliation
must be effected" and the interests must be balanced against one another.
3 0
amendment status of symbolic speech by deciding cases on narrower grounds. See R. O'Neil,
Free Speech: Responsible Communication Under Law 4 (1972); Nimmer 30; Comment, Flag
Desecration Statutes in Light of United States v. O'Brien and the First Amendment, 32 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 513, 518 (1971); 26 U. Fla. L. Rev. 615, 620 (1974).
26. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115 (1972) (cases cited); Emerson 8; Note, Freedom of Speech-Desecration of National Symbols
as Protected Political Expression, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1046 (1968). Even the absolutists agree
that the government may reasonably regulate "the 'how' and 'where' of the exercise of the
freedom. ... Brennan, The Supreme Court and The Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1965); see Political Freedom 39; Yarbrough, Black and His
Critics on Speech Plus and Symbolic Speech, 52 Texas L. Rev. 257, 264-65 (1974); cf. "What is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." A.
Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 25 (1972). But see "The fact that
conduct qua expression is 'speech' does not mean that it can not at all be regulated . . . but does
result in severe limitations on that process." United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 358 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See generally R. Dahl, After the Revolution 8-28
(1970).
27. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 193 (1972).
28. Id. at 192.
29. Id. at 192-93; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). A reasonable
regulation may amount to proscription of the communicative conduct. In a recent Ninth Circuit
case, a probation officer added the comment " 'Faith, Beauty, Integrity-REWARD-Love-
Peace-Happiness' " below an F.B.I. wanted poster of H. Rap Brown, Angela Davis and Eldridge
Cleaver on the wall of his office. Phillips v. Adult Probation Dep't, 491 F.2d 951, 952 (9th Cir.
1974). The officer claimed that the altered poster was a symbolic protest against the unfair
portrayal of the wanted persons by the media. Id. at 952-53. In the interest of promoting
efficiency of public service, and harmony within the agency, the court found that the employee's
symbolic protest could be proscribed. Id. at 956; cf. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)
(restriction of felons from holding office in waterfront labor organizations).
30. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961). This balancing process was recently
affirmed in United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
564 (1973); see Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575, 584-85
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 32 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Chafee]. Despite the delicate nature of the balance, the "judge, in order to
achieve a happy result in the balancing process, need only find some purpose that the challenged
legislation may rationally be said to serve, elevate that purpose to a position of vital social
importance, and then reduce the individual's desire for freedom of expression to the level of
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The Court has utilized three methods of weighing the government interest in
regulating communicative conduct.
The first, set forth in O'Brien, establishes that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.-"
Implicit in this test is the assumption that the conduct is divisible into
communicative and non-communicative elements. 32 O'Brien emphasizes that
a regulation must be addressed to the non-communicative aspect of the
conduct; the message itself may not be the focus of the restriction. 33
The First Circuit applied this test to a violation of a Massachusetts statute
proscribing conduct which "treat[ed] contemptuously the flag of the United
States. '34 The defendant had been prosecuted for wearing a replica of the flag
on the seat of his pants. The court found that the statute violated the third
O'Brien standard because it was "an effort to isolate and chastise an attitude
said to be contemptuous. '35 Concurring in the affirmance of this decision,
insignificant self-seeking in derogation of the public good." Alfange, The Balancing of Interests in
Free Speech Cases: In Defense of an Abused Doctrine, 2 Law in Trans. Q 35. 59 (1965)
However, "[t]here would appear to be no satisfactory alternative other than to place one's faith in
the judiciary . . . . " Id. at 63.
31. 391 U.S. at 377. For some of the diverse applications of the O'Brien test see Hoffa v,
Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1239-40 (D.D.C. 1974) (court found valid a restriction placed on
Hoffa's conduct as provided by a presidential commutation); Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs,
373 F. Supp. 363, 370-71 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (court found valid a zoning law proscribing adult
theaters and bookstores); Howard v. Warden, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972), appeal
dismissed, 474 F.2d 1341 (1973) (validating prison regulation concerning length of hair). But use
of the O'Brien test is no guarantee of conformity. Compare Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971.
988 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972) (finding substantial government interest in
preserving flag as national symbol) with Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (Ist Cir. 1972), aff'd in
part, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (found flag statute unconstitutional). It is interesting that in affirming
Goguen, the Supreme Court avoided using the O'Brien test, instead relying on an overbreath
analysis.
32. See 391 U.S. at 382. But see Henkin, The Supreme Court-1967 Term, Foreword: On
Drawing Lines, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 80 (1968) ("O'Brien's [conduct] was one activity, and it was
all speech."); see page 605 infra.
33. See 391 U.S. at 377; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (defendant was convicted of "offensive conduct" for wearing a
jacket with the legend "F- the Draft." The Court found the conviction invalid since the only
conduct which the state sought to punish was the communication.); cf. Papish v. University of
Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam) (content of college newspaper may not be proscribed unless
obscene); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam).
34. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); see
note 31 supra. See also A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, No. 73-2190 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 24,
1975).
35. 471 F.2d at 102. The statute in question also failed the fourth prong of the O'Brien test.
"[Olur analysis of the Massachusetts statute has revealed that those burdens are heavy and direct,
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Justice White noted that although the defendant could have "been convicted
for mutilating, trampling upon, or defacing the flag, ' 36 the statute punished
him for being contemptuous-"communicating ideas about the flag unaccept-
able to the controlling majority in the legislature. " 37
The Court may not be totally satisfied with the O'Brien test. Both Smith v.
Goguen38 and Street v. New York, 39 clearly raised the issue of how much first
amendment protection is accorded political speech in the form of communica-
tive conduct; in both, the Court opted for narrower grounds of decision.4 0 A
further criticism of the O'Brien test, as Professor Nimmer points out, is that it
is not enough that the burden on the communication further a non-speech
interest. 4 ' Rather, it should be shown that, without such a burden on the
conduct, the significant government interest is materially and substantially
obstructed.
The Court has adopted such a standard, 42 but only in the context where the
communicative conduct is akin to pure speech. For example, the Court has
held that the wearing of a black armband as an antiwar protest could not be
prohibited without a showing that the proscribed conduct would " 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school . ... , ,43
The Fifth Circuit recently applied this second test where a psychotherapist
was dismissed from a Veterans Administration hospital for his refusal to stop
wearing a peace pin while on duty.44 The court explained that defendant's
right to engage in symbolic conduct "could not be infringed upon, absent a
showing that the exercise of such rights 'materially and substantially' ",45
interfered with the government interest. After considering expert testimony as
to the psychological condition of the Vietnam war veteran patients, and the
deleterious effect a controversial peace pin would have upon them, the court
found that the proscription of the psychotherapist's conduct was valid. The
wearing of the peace pin materially and substantially interfered with the
government interest in rehabilitating the patients. 46
rather than incidental, and are consequently more extreme than necessary to prevent breaches of
the peace." Id. at 103.
36. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 587 (White, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 588.
38. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
39. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
40. See note 25 supra. In Street, the Court construed the conviction under the New York flag
statute as invalid because it punished the words that the defendant had uttered as he burned the
American flag on a street corner: " 'We don't need no damned flag'.. . 'If they let that happen to
Meredith we don't need an American flag'." 394 U.S. at 590. In Smith, the Court avoided tile
symbolic speech issue by finding the flag statute void for vagueness. 415 U.S. at 572.
41. Nimmer 43.
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
43. Id. at 509 (citation omitted).
44. Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 516 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 517-18.
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The implication of this standard is that it is the conduct itself which is
communicative. Unlike the O'Brien standard, under this test there is no
significant non-speech element within the conduct which the government may
safely regulate. 47 Consequently, the weighing of the government interest is
more exacting. There must be a showing of an imminent threat to the valid
governmental interest before the communicative conduct may be proscribed.
The decisive question according to a recent case is "how imminent must a
breach of the peace be, before [the state] can validly act to punish an
individual for exercising his First Amendment rights.' 48 In this case, a district
court concluded that a fair reading of the case law demanded that "objective
evidence which demonstrates the imminence of public unrest or a clear and
present danger that a breach of the peace is likely must be adduced before a
state may constitutionally act in a given case." 4 9 Merely because an expressed
idea may be offensive to an onlooker is not grounds for its regulation."0 A
"mere speculative or hypothetical possibility" is an insufficient demonstration
of government interest. s
The third test which has been applied to communicative conduct requires
that where the legislative scheme "broadly stifles" exercise of the first amend-
47. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. at 508. In O'Brien the Court
distinguished its case from one in which the conduct was wholly communicative. "The case at bar
is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in
some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be
harmful." 391 U.S. at 382. "[,V]hile the ordinance [proscribing nude entertainment] is not
directed to pure speech but is limited only to the 'conduct' of nudity, it may result in an
infringement upon free expression when such conduct is an integral part of a communicative
dance or play." Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 381 F. Supp. 859, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. Denno,
Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 35, 43-44 (1969).
48. United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, Civil No. 71-2738, at 21 (S.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 7, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Slip Opinion].
49. Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted); see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 190-91 (1972)
(substantial evidence of disruption needed); Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728,
731 (5th Cir. 1971); Chafee 35; cf. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974) (per curiam)
(use of characterization "chicken s-" by a court witness did not present such an imminent threat
to the administration of justice as to warrant contempt charges); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
108 (1973) (per curiam).
50. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (per curiam); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 23 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1965); Wiegand v. Seaver, 504
F.2d 303, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1974); Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 103 (1st Cir. 1972), aff'd in part,
415 U.S. 566 (1974); State v. Drake, 325 A.2d 52, 54-55 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1974) (it is not
enough merely to present one's middle finger in a emphatic gesture); see Comment, Violence and
Obscenity-Chaplinsky Revisited, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 141, 156-57 (1973); cf. Lewis v. New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
51. Slip Opinion at 24; see Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321, 324
(5th Cir. 1971); State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa, 1973). See also People v. Sutherland,
9 Ill. App. 3d 824, 826-27, 292 N.E.2d 746, 748 (3d Dist. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct.
3198 (1974); State v. Farrell, 209 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa, 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S.
Ct. 3198 (1974).
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ment freedom, the court may determine whether the government interest
could be preserved by a less drastic regulation. 52 While this mode of analysis
is arguably part of the O'Brien test,53 it is of sufficient importance to warrant
separate consideration.
[W]hen legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a
substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its
goal by means which have a "less drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First
Amendment freedoms. . . .The Constitution and the basic position of First Amend-
ment rights in our democratic fabric demand nothing less. 54
Underlying this analysis is the recognition that when both interests 'are
substantial, it is "inappropriate for this Court to label one as being more
important or more substantial than the other." 55 When first amendment rights
are involved, the regulation may be no more restrictive than necessary.
The appropriate application of these three standards for measuring the
government interest depends on the extent of the communicative element
involved in the regulated conduct. Whichever test is the most appropriate
appears to depend upon where the conduct lies on the court's sliding scale of
first amendment protection. However, no mechanism has been provided to
place an individual's conduct on that scale. A major criticism of the Court's
approach to the symbolic speech issue in O'Brien was that it provided no
means of deciding whether the individual's conduct was so communicative as
to come within the ambit of first amendment protection. 56 The Court merely
assumed that draft card burning was communicative. 7 Because of the
attenuated nature of first amendment protection, consideration must be given
to the extent of the communicative element in the conduct. Otherwise there
52. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see R. O'Neil, Free Speech: Responsible Communi-
cation Under Law 74-75 (1972); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative,
9 Utah L. Rev. 254, 267-93 (1964); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 971, 1011-17
(1974); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).
53. A government regulation is justified according to the fourth standard of the O'Brien test
"if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377. The Court "perceive[d] no alternative means
that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective
Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction." Id. at 381.
54. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967). The legislation must have "constituted
a 'substantial restraint' and a 'significant interference' " with a first amendment right, Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973), or unfairly and unnecessarily burden it. Lubin v. Panlsh, 415
U.S. 709, 716 (1974). For instance the requirement that any new political party must present
petitions signed by qualified voters totalling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the previous
gubernatorial election is such a substantial burden on first amendment rights that the government
must accomplish its goal by a less drastic means. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
55. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
56. See Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration, 12
Ariz. L. Rev. 71, 77 (1970); Comment, Flag Desecration Statutes in Light of United States v.
O'Brien and the First Amendment, 32 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 513, 520 (1971).
57. 391 U.S. at 376.
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can be no adequate measure of the impact of the regulation upon an
individual's first amendment rights.
The Court recently adopted a mode of analysis to determine whether
conduct is protected. In Spence v. Washington,5 8 a college student hung an
American flag upside down from his apartment window and taped a peace
symbol to each side. At trial for violation of the state flag statute, Spence
argued that he had attached the symbol to the flag to protest the contem-
poraneous invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State.5 9 In its
inquiry as to whether the conduct was protected by the first amendment, the
Court considered two factors--"the nature of [Spence's] activity .... [and] the
factual context and environment in which it was undertaken .... ",60 Noting
the presence of an intention to convey an idea which in all likelihood would
be understood by others, 61 the Court found that Spence's conduct was "a
pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current domestic
and foreign affairs of his government" which did not significantly impair any
valid state interest, and thus was protected by the first amendment. 62
I. RADICH-THE Two-STEP APPROACH
This analytical model was recently applied in United States ex rel. Radich
v. Criminal Court,63 which involved a violation of a flag desecration statute.
The defendant Radich had displayed in his art gallery certain antiwar
sculptures which were composed of American flags. Among other things, the
flag was used in objects which resembled a gun caisson and a human figure
hanging from a noose. 64 Although the defendant argued that the flag was
used as a means of political expression, 65 the state trial court found that he
58. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 408. Spence testified at trial that: " 'I felt that there had been so much killing and
that this was not what America stood for. I felt that the flag stood for America and I wanted
people to know that I thought America stood for peace.' " Id. In Cline v. Rockingham County
Super. Court, 502 F.2d 789 (Ist Cir. 1974), the defendant penned in ink a peace symbol on an
American flag which was sewn on a blanket. Defendant wore the blanket to a public beach for
the purpose of protesting war in general and Vietnam in particular. The court found such
communicative conduct to be within the ambit of the first amendment.
60. 418 U.S. at 409-10; see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 514 (Sth
Cir. 1974); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
61. State v. Farrell, 209 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1973), vacated, 94 S. CL 3198 (1974) (mem.)
(intent to communicate is necessary); see People v. Vaughn, 514 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Colo. 1973)
(content of speech depends on viewers' perception); Emerson 81; Symbolic Conduct 1109; cf.
United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972)
(communication may lose its constitutional protection because of intent of speaker).
62. 418 U.S. at 410, 415.
63. Civil No. 71-2738 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1974).
64. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 117 n.1, 257 N.E.2d 30, 31 n.1., 308 N.Y.S.2d 846,
848 n.1 (1970) (catalog of the various forms in which artist used flags).
65. Record at 80a-81a, Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (trial court testimony of
Radich). Art has had a long tradition as a media of protest. Michelangelo painted a cardinal and
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was not entitled to first amendment protection 66 and that the statute was a
valid exercise of the state's police power.6 7 The conviction was affirmed by
the New York Court of Appeals, 68 and subsequently by an equally divided
Supreme Court. 69 Radich then sued for habeas corpus, and the Second
Circuit, reversing the district court, remanded the case for a trial on the
merits. 70
After reviewing recent Supreme Court cases in the area of flag desecration,
Judge Cannella on remand found that the two-step analysis adopted by the
Court in Spence was the most appropriate one to be applied in Radich.
"First, [under this test] a determination [is made] of whether flag related
conduct is within the protections of the First Amendment, and, second,
whether, upon the record of the given case, the interests advanced by the
state are so substantial as to justify infringement of constitutional rights."71 In
its initial inquiry as to whether the sculptures displayed by Radich were
within the ambit of first amendment protection, the court considered the
context and environment of the showing. It applied the Spence requirements
that there must be an " 'intent to convey a particularized message' " and a
future pope in hell. Id. at 81a. "During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many artists were
deeply concerned with religious injustice and the moral and spiritual decay of the clergy."
Hieronymus Bosch, for instance, expressed his opposition to the worldly ways of the clergy in
"The Floating Conch." Brief for John B. Hightower (Director of the Museum of Modern Art),
Karl Katz (Director of The Jewish Museum) and Kenneth G. Dewey (Member, N.Y. State
Comm'n on Cultural Resources) as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531
(1971). American artists have protested such things as lynchings and bombings in the south (see
Paul Cadmus' "To the Lynching" and Charles White's "Birmingham Totem") and legal injustice
(see Ben Shahn's "Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti'). Id. at 7. War has also been a subject of
artistic protest (see Picasso's "Guernica" and Chaim Koppelman's "Vietnam"). Id. at 8. Finally,
flags have been featured in a great number of American works of art (e.g., Jasper John's "Flags").
Id at 15. Concerning the artistic value of the sculptures displayed in Radich's gallery, Hilton
Kramer, Art News Editor of the New York Times, testified that even the construction
representing the flag as a phallus had "much substance." Record at 91a, Radich v. New York,
401 U.S. 531 (1971) (trial court testimony). See generally, R. Shiker, The Indignant Eye:Artist as
Social Critic in Prints and Drawings from Fifteenth Century to Picasso (1969).
66. "We cannot find that the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment includes a
license to desecrate the flag. It is inconceivable to us that the authors of the Bill of Rights could
have intended that the protection of the First Amendment could or should be stretched so far."
People v. Radich, 53 Misc. 2d 717, 720, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1967), aff'd,
26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 401
U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam).
67. Id.
68. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals, unlike the trial
court, implicitly recognized that Radich's conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
120, 257 N.E.2d at 33, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
69. Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam) (4-4 decision, Douglas, J., did not
sit).
70. United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 459 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1115 (1973) (the lower court decision was unreported).
71. Slip Opinion at 10.
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" 'likelihood ... that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it.' ")72
Analyzed in this manner, the court found that the constructions not only
conveyed the artist's protest against the Vietnam War, but were displayed in
such a fashion-with antiwar songs played in the background-that the
viewer understood the message. 73 The court found Radich's conduct to be
symbolic speech protected by the first amendment. Furthermore, it noted that
had the "case not been presented to the State Courts as a 'symbolic speech'
case... [this] Court might well be persuaded to analyze Radich's activity in
terms of 'pure speech' alone."'74
This analysis differs from the approach taken in other symbolic speech
cases in that an initial determination was made of the individual's first
amendment interests involved. Other cases merely assumed a first amend-
ment interest was involved and concentrated the analysis on the nature of the
government interest. 75 This stemmed from the Supreme Court's failure-until
Spence-to provide a standard under which to determine the individual's
interest.76 An advantage of this analysis is that it clarifies the relationship
between the government regulation and the first amendment rights involved.
In addition, a more exact balancing is possible when both interests are
articulated.
In the second step of its analysis, the court considered whether the state's
interest in regulating flag use was so significant as to justify regulating the
defendant's symbolic speech. Judge Cannella discussed the three principal
state interests which had been advanced by the Court in Spence: "(1)
prevention of breach of the peace; (2) protection of the sensibilities of
passersby; and (3) preservation of the American flag as an unalloyed symbol
of our country," 77 as well as the fact that the flags involved in Radich were
privately owned78 and displayed on private property. 79
72. Id. at 12; see notes 60 & 61 supra and accompanying text.
73. "In such an environment, in the context and tenor of those times, 'it would have been
difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of [petitioner's] point at the time that he
made it' by the display of the sculptures." Slip Opinion at 13.
74. Id. at 12 n.34. This parallels the dissenting opinion in the New York Court of Appeals;
see 26 N.Y.2d 114, 127, 257 N.E.2d 30, 37, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 856 (1970) (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971) (per curiam). In Long Island
Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, the Second Circuit found that buttons using the flag (e.g.,
campaign, peace and slogan buttons) were akin to pure speech and that the state had no
demonstrated interest in prohibiting them. 437 F.2d 344, 349 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 92 S. CL
3197 (1974) (mem.).
75. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
76. See Slip Opinion at 8; note 56 supra.
77. Slip Opinion at 14. These interests were originally spelled out in Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 591 (1969) (defendant burned flag on street corner in frustration upon hearing of the
attempted assassination of James Meredith).
78. Slip Opinion at 15. In Spence v. Washington, the Court distinguished Spence's privately
owned flag from the situation in which the government could proscribe misuse of a flag that was
public property. 418 U.S. at 411.
79. Slip Opinion at 15. In Spence, the Court found it significant that the conduct "occurred
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Beginning with the third justification, the court reasoned that the flag, as
used in the sculptures, still retained its universal symbolism, since the only
difference was the context in which it was used-for protest and dissent.80
Moreover, had the flag not been used, the protest value of the constructions
would have been meaningless. The use of the flag was integral to the
expression of antiwar sentiment. Distinguishing this case from those in which
the flag was burned, the court held that "[t]he symbol was not consumed by
the sculptures, but rather, flourished in all of its communicative majesty,
unalloyed and undiminished. 'It is the character, not the cloth, of the flag
which' the State of New York has interest in preserving and, here, the
symbolic character of the flag was neither trammeled upon nor dimmed." 8'
The court acknowledged that this symbolism might revolt some, but it
observed that others might be more concerned with the fundamental right to
diversity of opinion which underlies our democracy. 82
In answer to the argument that the sensibilities of a passerby are a valid
state interest,, the court noted that expression may not be proscribed because
some might find it offensive.8 3 Moreover, the court found that the sculptures
were privately displayed, and that there was no captive audience problem. 84
Finally, the court ascertained that the state interest in preserving public
peace, though otherwise valid, could not be established by a mere hypotheti-
cal assertion of danger.85 Objective evidence such as a crowd gathering
outside the gallery or an altercation within the premises must be found to
demonstrate the imminence of public unrest. 86 The court found only an
undifferentiated fear of disturbance which was insufficient to justify proscrip-
tion of the conduct involved.8 7
on private property, rather than in an environment over which the state by necessity must have
certain supervisory powers unrelated to expression." 418 U.S. at 411.
80. Slip Opinion at 17.
81. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. This is akin to the "marketplace of ideas" philosophy of Justice Holmes in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see note 2 supra and accompany-
ing text.
83. But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
84. Radich's gallery was on the second floor; anyone who was offended could readily pass It
by. See Slip Opinion at 4.
85. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (clear and present danger); note 50
supra and accompanying text.
86. Slip Opinion at 20; see note 48 supra and accompanying text. In People v. Keough, the
New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision which had relied on Radich in
finding that pictures of a nude model provocatively draped in the flag published in a college
newspaper had presented a danger to public peace which could be regulated. 31 N.Y.2d 281, 290
N.E.2d 819, 338 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1972).
87. At the base of the court's opinion is the recognition that while "[elvery Idea Is an
incitement" and that every antisocial idea may hypothetically result in violence, If robust and
unfettered debate is to be insured, expression may not be regulated without a showing of
imminent threat to the government interest. See Slip Opinion at 22-23. First amendment rights
"are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
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The court did not specifically analyze the government interests involved in
terms of the three tests, i.e., O'Brien,88  material and substantial
interference,8 9 and less drastic means. 90 However, its discussion, especially in
the area of the government's interest in preserving the peace, closely approxi-
mates the standards set forth in the material and substantial interference
test.91 The use of this test would be appropriate for a situation similar to
Radich, because it applies to conduct whose aim is communication. 92
Moreover this test requires, as does the court in Radich, evidence that the
threat to the government interest is imminent.93
Although the O'Brien test has been used in other flag cases, 94 the court in
Radich did not apply it. The reason may be that the court viewed the conduct
involved as akin to pure speech. Distinguishing the use of a flag as a vehicle
for expression, the court stated that "the flag as displayed by petitioner...
was itself the idea, the sine qua nwn for the artist's endeavors." 95 Since a
communicative and a non-speech element must exist in the conduct involved
in order to apply the O'Brien test, its use would have been inapposite in
Radich. 96
(flag salute was conduct protected by the first amendment which the state could not compel);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Conversely, to view a
threat of violence as a valid ground for suppressing symbolic speech is to grant the mob a veto
over the exercise of first amendment rights.
88. See notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
91. The court compared the undifferentiated fear of public unrest with another case in which
the fear of a material and substantial interference with the government interest in rehabilitating
war veterans was sufficient to justify proscription of wearing a peace pin by the hospital staff.
Slip Opinion at 23 n.65; see notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
92. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138
(D. Md. 1970) (picture of a burning flag on the cover of a student publication found to be a form
of art); Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and Analysis, 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 193,
219-23 (1972); "Displaying art, no matter how repulsive, is nothing if it is not communication."
Note, Flag Desecration Under the First Amendment: Conduct or Speech, 32 Ohio St. L.J. 119,
146 (1971). See also Comment, New York Flag Desecration Statute-Abridgement of First
Amendment Rights-Symbolic Protest through Artistic Expression, 16 N.Y.L.F. 493, 501 (1970).
93. Compare text accompanying notes 86 and 87 supra with text accompanying notes 47 and
48 supra.
94. State v. Farrell, 209 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct.
3198 (1974) (mem.) (citing a comprehensive list of cases utilizing the O'Brien test).
95. Slip Opinion at 18.
96. The New York Court of Appeals, in its opinion, applied the O'Brien test, and found that
the state's interest in preserving the peace was unrelated to the suppression of free expresson and
therefore did not present a first amendment problem. 26 N.Y.2d at 124, 257 N.E.2d at 36, 308
N.Y.S.2d at 854; see notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text. The dissent in the New York
Court of Appeals argued, however, that "[ilt is evident that the only reason why these works...
were singled out for prosecution was not because the flag was used in the sculptures but solely
because of the particular political message which those sculptures were intended to convey." 26
N.Y.2d at 128, 257 N.E.2d at 38, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). Radich was
convicted for "contemptuous use of the flag of the United States." 53 Misc. 2d at 719, 279
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Radich, in effect following the dissent in the New York Court of Appeals,
argued to the Supreme Court on the basis of the less drastic means test, that
" '[a]ny sensible construction of the first amendment would forbid a legislature
to go out of its way to inhibit expression, either by design or accident, and the
choice of the harsher of equally effective means suggests that suppression of
speech was the legislature's real purpose from the start.' ,,97 Because Radich's
first amendment right is so substantial, even if the government interest in
regulation is compelling, it must be sustained by a less drastic means which
does not substantially or unnecessarily interfere with the individual interest. 98
The significance of Radich lies in its two-step analysis, the first inquiry
being whether the individual's conduct comes within the ambit of first
amendment protection. A determination of the first amendment protection
accorded the individual interest should indicate the test to be used in
establishing the legitimacy of the government interest. If the conduct, is
wholly communicative, the material and substantial interference test is
appropriate. If the conduct has both a communicative and a non-
communicative element, then the O'Brien test is appropriate. Finally, if the
substantial individual interest is broadly stifled by the regulation, then the
government interest must be sustained by a less drastic means.
Radich, however, dealt with art, which is wholly communicative in itself.
The court specifically distinguished the case from one in which the conduct is
not in itself communicative, but is a vehicle for the communicative element.
Such an activity therefore has a communicative and a non-communicative
element. Whether the conduct is almost entirely communicative or has a
minimal communicative element, however, the same O'Brien test applies.
Consequently, the line which denotes lesser first amendment protection is
transferred from speech/conduct to communicative conduct combined with a
non-communicative element. While this does bring more expression into the
area of freedom of speech, it is still an arbitrary cut-off. It accords lesser first
N.Y.S.2d at 683. The Supreme Court has struck down a Massachusetts statute which
proscribed conduct which "treats contemptuously" the American flag. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566 (1974). Justice White, in his concurring opinion, however, distinguished a statute which
proscribed casting contempt (similar to New York's) from those reaching acts such as mutilation
and not expression of ideas. Id. at 588-89 n.3 (White, J., concurring).
97. Brief for Appellant at 9, Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971), quoting Note, Less
Drastic Means and The First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464, 469 (1969). The New York Court of
Appeals implied in its decision that suppression was the main purpose of the statute. See 26
N.Y.2d at 124, 257 N.E.2d at 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
98. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. "[Tihough the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (statute which required teachers in state schools to file lists of
organizations of which they were members found invalid); Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp.
528, 532 (D. Del. 1970) (finding state flag statute unconstitutional), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hodsdon v. Stabler, 444 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1971). "Even when a compelling interest exists,
if the statute protects that interest by a needless infringement of First Amendment rights, it must
be struck down." United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1076 (1973).
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amendment protection to communicative conduct simply because a non-
communicative element is found.
IV. COMMUNICATIVE VS. NON-COMMUNICATIVE: A DISTINCTION
WITHOUT MERIT
Conduct does not lend itself to arbitrary division into communicative and
non-communicative elements. Theoretically at least, all conduct is to some
degree communicative. The act of political assassination for example, is, in
itself, communicative. It is the consequences of murder of a citizen and
disruption of the political process which require proscription of the conduct,
not the existence of a non-communicative element. Similarly, draft card
burning is, in itself, wholly communicative. 99 The gravamen of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in O'Brien was that the deleterious impact upon the
Selective Service System caused by the destruction of draft cards justified
regulation, notwithstanding the communication involved.' 00 Regulation of
symbolic speech does not depend upon the existence of a non-communicative
element. The real inquiry is whether there is an unacceptable interference
with the public interest. 10 ' Positing a non-communicative element merely
obscures the question.
Freedom of expression may be exercised in many ways and the mode
chosen should not automatically indicate the degree of first amendment
protection. Relegating symbolic conduct to lesser first amendment protection
takes a too narrow and technical view of protected expression. 0 2 If the
initial inquiry establishes, as in Radich, that the particular form of expression
is protected by the first amendment, then the question of whether the
regulation is justified should depend upon the relative interference with the
governmental interest. For this reason, the material and substantial interfer-
ence test seems most appropriate. As Meiklejohn has pointed out, "some
preventions are more evil than are the evils from which they would save
us. 1 0 3 By demanding objective evidence of interference, and not merely an
undifferentiated fear, the material and substantial interference test, perhaps
subject to a "less drastic means test" review, would require a demonstration
of the evil sought to be prevented. Under this more exacting test, it would be
less likely that a frivolous or prejudicial abrogation of freedom of expression
would be found valid.1 4*
Finbarr J. O'Neill
99. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
100. See 391 U.S. at 377-82. For criticism of the Court's reasoning in this regard, see Alfange,
Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 15.
101. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
103. A. Meildejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 48 (1972).
104. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
* As this Note went to press, Radich was reported in 385 F. Supp. 165.
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